A NONLINEAR OPTIMAL CONTROL MODEL FOR MITIGATING MARINE INSECURITY THROUGH PATROL RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Abstract

Marine insecurity, particularly the rising incidence of piracy and illegal maritime activities, poses a major threat to global trade, regional economies, and human safety. This study develops a nonlinear dynamical model that captures the interactions between vulnerable vessels, pirate groups, and naval patrol forces. The model incorporates resource allocation as an optimal control variable, representing patrol intensity, which simultaneously reduces attack success and suppresses pirate activity. Using Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, an optimal control formulation is derived to minimize the number of successful attacks while balancing the operational costs of patrol deployment. Numerical simulations demonstrate the impact of varying patrol strategies on the dynamics of marine insecurity, highlighting threshold conditions that determine whether piracy persists or declines. The results provide insight into effective resource allocation strategies for maritime security agencies, emphasizing the balance between economic costs and long-term deterrence. This work offers a quantitative framework for decision-making in combating marine insecurity.